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Introduction
Theories of economic development postulate that rural-to-urban migration is the driving force of a country's development. Following Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) people migrate from rural to urban areas to nd well paid employment which is not available in rural areas. If migrants do not nd a job with higher rewards than their reservation wage they will stay unemployed or return. In this model the unemployment rate acts as the driving force in determining a migration equilibrium. The theory is extended by Lucas (2004) who argues that high urban wages are attributed to high skills and not accessible for low skilled immigrants. In his model, individuals migrate to the cities to accumulate work experience as a form of human capital formation. According to human capital theory (Becker, 1964) , the accumulation of experience will raise future earnings prospective. This will in turn reduce poverty and welfare dependency. Following this augmentation, the two main incentives to migrate are (1) earning high wages and (2) the accumulation of human capital.
This implies that wages are higher in the cities than in the countryside, which has been clearly demonstrated by economists for decades. Besides the wage dierences between rural and urban areas, there are also wage dierences between the types of job a worker can obtain, i.e. a formal job or an informal job. Early theories by Lewis (1954) and Fields (1975) suggest that the informal sector is the disadvantaged segment of a dual labour market in which workers are not protected by social security regulations and are in weak bargaining positions with their employers. However, in the last decades, some developing countries have shown a reversed development: the informal sector has been increasing. This has aroused the interest of economists to test the segmented market hypothesis empirically. For Mexico, e.g. Maloney (1999) , Maloney (2004) , Marcouiller et al. (1997) and Bargain and Kwenda (2009) show that informal work is indeed voluntary for reasons such as opportunity costs and exibility. Hence, instead of simply queuing for a formal job, people earn wages and accumulate human capital in the informal sector.
In Mexico, as in many other countries, wage dierentials have many dimensions, e.g. between rural and urban employment and between formal and informal sectors. An urban wage premium enhances rural-to-urban migration which in turn leads to social and economic problems, such as un-and underemployment, poverty, crime and an increasing informal sector rather than to economic development. Figure 1 shows the decrease of the rural population and the increase of population density in four of Mexico's largest cities, namely Mexico City, Guadalajara, Puebla and Monterrey. It shows that between 1995 and 2008 the rural population decreased from 27 to 23% while population density in the cities rose. All four example cities show a similar development, i.e. an increase in population density of about 23% within 14 years, which is approximately 1.5% per year. Furthermore, Figure 2 displays the development of the urban and total open unemployment rate in Mexico over the period mid-2000 to mid-2006 and the rise in informal employment over the same period. It can be seen that the urban unemployment rate is much larger than the total open unemployment rate, but exhibits the same pattern. Moreover, the higher the unemployment rate is, the larger is the informal sector share. Combined with Figure 1 , these macroeconomic indicators suggest that the increase in rural-to-urban migration, rising urban population density, more unemployment and larger informal sector shares go hand-in-hand. distinguishes between salaried and non-salaried workers by employer or rm dependency. Non-salaried workers, i.e. the self-employed, are excluded from this analysis as their incomes need special attention and cannot easily be compared to wages of salaried workers, and needs to be covered in a separate study.
The Mexican Social Security Law requires salaried workers to be registered by their employers with the IMSS (Insitituto Mexicano del Seguro Social). However, there are several incentives not to register and simply work informally which are not mutually exclusive. One is the high price for social security coverage which amounts to about 30% of a worker's wage in one of the lowest three deciles of the wage distribution (Levy, 2008) . Furthermore, social security benets have to be bought as a bundle even if the worker does not want or need all components. Other incentives are the various social protection benets (health insurance, housing subsidies, pension schemes, access to day care centres and life insurance) which can be bought independently and are almost free for poor workers when they are not ocially working for an employer. Importantly, non-registration goes hand-in-hand with the avoidance of payroll taxes. These are reasons why the Social Security Law is violated massively, leading to a persisting large share of informal employment. To overcome the econometric problem of self-selection into work as opposed to not working and selection into dierent sectors of the labour market, the Heckman (1979) selection-bias correction model is applied. Separate wage equations for formal and informal salaried workers in rural and urban areas are estimated, including the generated non-selection hazard from a Probit model. We nd the expected large and signicant urban wage premium in both the formal and informal sector. Subsequently, Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition techniques are used to show to which extent the rural-urban wage dierential can be explained by (a) individuals' personal endowments dierences and (b) dierences in unobservable characteristics. Moreover, we analyse rural-to-urban migrants' labour market performance. The results suggest structural dierences between the formal and informal sector. In the informal sector, the rural-urban wage dierential is explained by dierences in levels of human capital endowments. The unexplained part however is solely driven by dierences in returns to experience. In the formal sector, only dierences in observable education levels can explain the wage dierential. The results suggest that rural-to-urban migration will continue and the informal sector will further increase in size.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section reviews the existing literature on rural-urban wage dierentials and migration incentives. Section 3 describes the empirical strategy to identify wage dierentials and account for selectivity bias.
Section 4 explains the data and provides descriptive statistics. Section 5 discusses the main ndings and the last section concludes.
Literature review
The literature on rural-to-urban migration is based on the theoretical models by Todaro (1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970) . According to their models, people migrate from rural to urban areas to nd high wage jobs which are not available in rural areas. If people do not nd a job with higher rewards than their reservation wage they will stay unemployed or return; the unemployment rate acts as a the driving force on determining a migration equilibrium. This theory is extended by e.g. Lucas (2004) who argues that high urban wages are attributed to high skills and not accessible by low skilled immigrants. In his model, people migrate to the cities to accumulate work experience as a form of human capital.
Newer models of migration also include social factors such as previous migration experience, networks and inequality in the migration decision. One factor that has received much attention in recent years is relative deprivation, i.e. the perception of an individual or household to be worse o or disadvantaged compared to a particular reference group, for example, other people in the same village (Quinn, 2006 , Stark and Taylor, 1989 , 1991 . Quinn (2006) uses the data from the Mexican Migration
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Another notable study is Meng (2001) which is one of the few studies which distinguish formal and informal labour and investigate rural-urban migration in the same context. For China, she nds that urban work experience raises the probability of becoming a formal worker and that wage dierences are mainly explained by observable personal endowments.
One drawback in the literature on informal labour markets is the dierent definitions of informality, which impede the comparison of the results. Generally, the most commonly used denitions can be classied into two groups. First, the legal denition is based on the contribution to the social security system (e.g. TannuriPianto and Pianto, 2002 , Bosch and Maloney, 2007 , 2008 . Informal workers are those, who do not contribute to the social security system and, simultaneously, do not benet from social security regulations such as health care and pension schemes. Another legal denition is based on the formality of the workers' contracts. Here, informal workers are those, who do not have a written contract and, consequently, cannot assert their labour rights. However, they may enjoy more exibility. The other group of denitions is based on productivity grounds. According to them, the informal sector comprises workers in rms with less than or equal to ve employees (e.g. Maloney, 1999, Gong and van Soest, 2002) , based on the argument that small rms tend neither to register their business nor their employees. The problem with rm size as a measure is that larger rms tend to pay higher wages and are at risk of being caught defaulting as their number of employees increases. Hence, they are more likely to register (Badaoui et al., 2007) . In this study the most unambiguous, legalistic, denition is used which corresponds to registration with the social security system.
All articles found in an intensive literature search and cited here for Mexico are based on either rural or urban household surveys or solely on migrants. Using the novel Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) allows the investigation of wage dierentials between rural and urban workers in dierent sectors. Notably, households from rural areas are more likely to be exposed to poverty and low (formal) employment opportunities and the likelihood for working informal is higher in rural areas 9 compared to urban areas.
Empirical Methodology
The empirical strategy to identify the determinants of the rural-urban wage dierential and to nd out which wage related factors are mainly driving rural-to-urban migration is to estimate wage regressions and to apply Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition techniques.
One issue that has to be taken into account when estimating wage equations for dierent groups of workers is dierent sources of selection bias. The most obvious source is the selection bias from self-selection into work vs. not working, i.e. sample selection. The other source is, given that an individual is working, self-selection into one sector of the labour market, distinguishing between formal salaried employment, informal salaried employment and self-employment 3 . As the self-employed have a very dierent wage determination compared to salaried workers, they are excluded from the sample 4 . Hence, the remaining sectors are formal salaried employment and informal salaried employment.
To account for selection bias, Heckman (1979) selection models are estimated.
This two-step model is described in the following example for the self-selection into work -bias correction. First, a Probit model is estimated to determine the probability of individual i working (w i = 1) as opposed to not working (w i = 0) which can be written as:
where Z i are observed characteristics of the individual, such as human capital and family indicators, γ is the vector of coecients of these variables and u i is the error term which is normally distributed with zero mean and unity variance. Subsequently, the non-selection hazard (also known as inverse Mill's ratio) λ w/nw is calculated from the estimated parameters of the selection equation. This is included in the second step wage regression which has the following form
where y i is the hourly wage of individual i, β is a vector of coecients of observable personal and household characteristics X i and i the error term which is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and variance σ 2 . y i is observed if and
The wage equations will be estimated both using ordinary least squares (OLS) and with the two-step method including the non-selection hazard term. The estimation results suggest that there is no selfselection into work as the non-selection hazard coecient is insignicant and the other coecients do not dier between OLS and Heckman two-step. Hence, we do not need to account for self-selection into work but only for self-selection into formal employment when estimating wage equations for formal and informal workers separately. Hence, we only include the selection bias correction term λ f /inf generated from a Probit model in which the dependent variable is a dummy for working formally as opposed to informally and vice versa for the other group.
Subsequently, the two-fold Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique (Blinder, 1973 , Oaxaca, 1973 ) is used to nd out in how far dierences in wages between rural and urban workers are explained by dierences in observable characteristics and to which part dierences remain unexplained. The decomposition technique can be written as
whereβ U andβ R are recovered from the separate wage equations of the rural and urban samples. β * is a vector of coecients from a pooled model over both samples which includes a dummy variables which identies the populations. The left hand side of equation (3) is the raw wage gap, the right hand side consists of the dierence in characteristics or explained part and the unexplained part due to dierences in coecients. To determine the explained part the group dierences in the endowments vector is weighted by the coecients vector of the rural population. To identify the contribution of the human capital variables separately, we decompose the rural-urban wage dierential in detail.
Data
The data used is the novel Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) which is a panel The data is restricted to men and women between the age of 16 and 65 years. Self-employed workers, full-time students and the seriously ill (incapable) are excluded from the sample. The nal sample consists of almost 10,000 individuals of whom 44% are salaried workers in either formal or informal employment. The detailed distribution of the workforce is displayed in Table 1 . Thosè not employed' include also workers without remuneration. In the rural areas 36% are salaried workers. In urban areas 49% are employed. Individuals were dened as living in a rural area if they live in a community with less than 2500 inhabitants, and in an urban area otherwise. Unfortunately, we are not able to control for dierences in costs of living between rural and urban areas since consumer price indices (CPI) for Mexico are based on informarion collected in urban areas. Also, there was no question in the data set which could have been used as an alternative to the CPI for measuring costs of living.
There are dierent denitions of informality in the literature, being based in rm size, contracts or occupations. The here used legal denition of the informal sector is based on the denition of Mexico's Federal Labour Law, which distinguishes between salaried and non-salaried workers by employer or rm dependency. Within this denition the number of subgroups is large and assigning occupations to certain groups is not possible as the majority of jobs can be salaried and non-salaried. One example that is given by Levy (2008) is a shoe shiner who can work independently and also he could be employed by a hotel being a salaried worker. Salaried workers are eligible to social security benets which include health insurance, pension, child care, housing loans, life and work-risk insurance and sports and cultural facilities, when they are registered with the IMSS (Insitituto Mexicano del Seguro Social). Moreover, they are protected by ring regulations and severance pay.
In fact, Social Security Law prescribes that salaried workers must be registered by their employers with the IMSS. The denition of informality based on enrolling with IMSS is most relevant and accurate for Mexico because of the legal labour market institutions as explained by Levy (2008) . Hence, information on the working contracts is used to dene informal workers 7 . This classies those individuals as informal workers who do not have an ISSSTE-contract (government workers) or an IMSS-contract (registered to social security) and formal if they have either. The ISSSTE is the social security institution for public sector workers and the armed forces. As not all public workers are registered with ISSSTE, e.g. public workers in educational institutions and workers of the public electricity companies, it is impossible to exclude all public workers and hence they form the group of formal workers together with all workers who are registered with IMSS. This legalistic denition is also used by e.g. Bosch and Maloney (2007) and Bargain and Kwenda (2009) . The key dependent variable is log hourly wage which is constructed by dividing reported average monthly earnings by 4.33 times reported average hours worked per week. Individuals who failed to report positive wages were deleted from the sample, accounting for about 2%. Additionally, the top and the bottom two percentiles of the wage distribution were deleted from the sample to avoid bias due to outliers. Figure  3 shows the mean of hourly log wages of workers in the dierent groups. It can easily be seen that formal urban wages are highest on average and rural informal wages are lowest. Formal rural and informal urban workers have about the same mean wage. Figure 4 plots hourly wages for all groups separately on years of schooling and experience, respectively. It can be seen that wages dier with regard to schooling for the highest educational groups as can be expected, with lowest wages for rural informal workers and highest for urban formal workers. The graph for experience shows a greater dierence between the groups. These patterns will be more precisely analysed in the next section. The key independent variables are experience, education, cognitive ability and family and job characteristics. Experience is modelled as Mincerian potential experience (age minus years of schooling minus 6) because job history is not available in the data. The individuals are divided into two education groups, i.e. education up to compulsory level (0-9 years of schooling) or more (≥10 years), including high school and university graduates. A special feature of the MxFLS is that a Raven's test was conducted with almost every individual. The Raven's test scores measure an individual's cognitive ability and the test scores are included in the regressions 8 .
In the returns to education literature it is argued that an individual's educational achievement is inuenced by their intelligence and the inclusion would lead to endogeneity bias (Card, 1999 , Psacharopoulos, 1994 . However, the correlation coecient between the years of education and the test score is 0.33 suggesting that endogeneity problems can be neglected. The inclusion of the test score should only lower the education estimates.
Family characteristics include household size, number of elderly and infants in the household, dummies for being the household head, being married and measures of a person's character. These measures include risk attitudes, assessed from a battery of 8 see Raven et al. (2003) for more information about the test. questions in a hypothetical lottery included in the data and if a person is`honest', i.e. agreeing to the statement Laws are there to be broken. The personality variables, along with having a farm or not and the number of infants and elderly persons, serve as selection variables in the Probit models. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on these variables. It can be seen that the average years of work experience are higher in rural areas than in urban areas. This pattern is very similar in the formal and the informal sector with about 22-24 years in rural and about 20-21 years in urban areas. It appears that the dierences in years of experience are driven by dierences in education and are not due to age dierences as the age proles do not dier largely between rural and urban residents. Years of work experience are highly correlated with age because we can only use potential experience. After discussing the main results, we will also discuss some robustness checks which show that the results for returns to experience dier from those for age.
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Notably, the share of high educated workers is very dierent between sectors. The highest share of high educated workers is in the urban formal sector with 43% of all workers. In the urban informal sector, 32% are university educated as well as in the formal rural sector and only 10% of the informal workers in the rural areas have attended high school and/or university or college. Furthermore, the urban workforce performs better in the Raven's test score. These observations hint at the existence of self-selection into formal employment in rural and urban areas based on human capital endowments. Also, dierences between rural and urban workers exist with regard to psychological indicators such as risk attitudes and honesty.
Results

All workers
In this section we discuss the results from the wage regressions for all workers. First, it is important to note that wage regressions which include the non-selection hazard term generated from the Probit estimations show that self-selection into salaried employment does not aect the wage determination neither in rural nor in urban areas (Table 3) and it can be concluded that the wage regression results are not biased due to self-selection into work. Hence, in the subsequent wage regressions for formal and informal workers, it is not necessary to control for self-selection into work which allows a relatively simple estimation procedure. In the following, we will base our discussion on the OLS estimation results
.
At this point it has to be made clear, that although the wage regressions are based on cross-sections, unobserved ability bias is reduced due to the Raven's test score variable. The test score coecient is 17% for urban workers and 13% for rural workers, suggesting that by answering one more of the twelve questions correctly the wage is raised on average by 13 percentage points.
In the wage regression for the whole sample (column 2), it can be seen that a signicant urban wage premium exists and amounts to 20%. This nding is very similar to the results of Glaeser and Maré (2001) for the US. The wage regression for all workers in the sample is extended by interaction terms of the human capital variables with the urban residence dummy. Only the work experience interaction coecients are signicant and suggest that experience is higher rewarded in urban areas than in rural areas by about 1.1%-points. These ndings are further supported by the separate wage equations for rural and urban workers (columns 5-8). While the return to one additional year of work experience is 2.3% in urban areas, it is not signicantly dierent from zero in rural areas. This nding is important because higher rewards for work experience in urban areas will play a role in the decision to stay in 9 The Probit estimation results can be found in Appendix Table A1. 16 an urban area if they live there or to migrate to a city if they are currently living in the countryside. However, the coecients cannot be compared quantitatively as they were estimated in separate regressions. To see if experience is indeed such an important factor in explaining the wage dierential, detailed decomposition analyses will be applied. Before we come to these results, we will discuss the ndings of the formal/informal sector wage analyses.
Formal vs. informal workers
As mentioned in the literature section, several authors have found wage dierentials between formal and informal workers. We show that this dierential also exists in 2005 in Mexico, even when distinguishing between rural and urban workers. That the dierential also exists in the rural areas of 16% and 12% in the cities (Table 3, columns 6 and 8) is novel evidence because earlier studies on the formal wage gap in Mexico were mostly based on the National Urban Employment Survey which did not cover rural households until recently.
To avoid potential bias from self-selection into formal employment Probit regressions were conducted for all, rural and urban workers separately. The results can be found in Appendix Table A2 . It can be seen that changing residence from rural to urban increases a worker's probability of working formally as opposed to informally by 16%-points, which can be expected when taking into account that only 22% of all workers in rural areas but 41% of all urban workers are formally employed. The separate probit equations for rural and urban workers show that determination of formal employment diers between rural and urban employees with respect to cognitive ability, other household earnings and household size. For example, in rural areas, scoring high in Raven's test raises the probability of working formally by 10%-points and is insignicantly dierent from zero in urban areas. Psychology characteristics do not seem to play a role in the choice of formal compared to informal employment.
Furthermore, health only plays a role in urban areas. Most important for both urban and rural workers to decide for or access formal employment is high education. Also, the larger the household, the less likely a worker is formally employed in rural areas, but there is no eect for urban workers.
The results of the separate wage equations for formal and informal sector workers support what we have found in the wage equation for all workers but suggest quantitative dierences between the sectors. The tables are in the appendix (Tables   A3 and A4 ). For both formal and informal workers self-selection is not distorting the results as in all regressions the non-selection hazard coecient is insignicant.
From the regression for informal workers we can see that a signicant urban wage premium exists, which is further supported by the separate equations (columns 5 to 8). We also nd a signicant return to high education of about 14% in the rural and 22% in the urban areas. For informal workers there is no return to cognitive ability as the coecient is not signicantly dierent from zero. For informal workers in urban areas the return to experience is 1.3%-points higher than for informal rural workers. No other human capital related factors are signicantly dierently rewarded in urban than in rural areas (see Figure 5 ). For the formal sector, this is not found (see Figure 6) . Note that the returns to experience are insignicant for rural workers in the informal sector. For formal workers, the results suggest that human capital, other than education, is not rewarded in rural areas as the coecients are not signicantly dierent from zero. The results show that it is important to separate the workforce into different groups when the intention is to detect determinants of wage inequality. We will decompose the wage dierential in the next section to uncover which role the dierent indicators of human capital play in the determination of rural-urban wage dierentials.
In essence, the results suggest that experience is not rewarded in the rural areas but in urban areas. This will elevate the incentive to migrate to the urban areas. As a consequence, the informal sector will increase in urban areas, assuming that formal jobs do not emerge as quickly as the rural population migrates. Table A5 shows that the overall dierence between urban and rural wages is 32% for informal workers and 23% for formal workers. About one third of the dierential can be explained by observable characteristics in the informal sector and in the formal Table 4 for informal and formal workers, respectively. The results for informal workers show that dierences in experience, education and cognitive ability endowments largely explain the wage gap. When we look at the unexplained part, it can be seen that dierences in coecients of work experience account for the largest share of the unexplained part, the coecient is -0.4 and statistically signicant at a 1% level. Returns to education and cognitive ability do not play a role in the unexplained part of the rural-urban wage dierential, nor do the returns or premia to other characteristics. Hence, there are signicant dierences in returns to experience, even after controlling for other observable characteristics and self-selection.
Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition
In the formal sector, this dierence in coecients does not exist neither for experience nor for any other variable. Solely the dierences in average human capital endowments explain the wage gap in the formal sector as can be seen in Table 4 . This shows that it is not sucient estimating separate wage equations for rural and urban workers to identify dierences in returns to endowments. This nding supports the hypothesis that urban rms are more human capital intensive and high education is important in those rms while they reward work experience higher than rural rms.
Robustness checks
We conduct a series of robustness checks to make sure that inconsistencies in the data set do not drive the results and that we did not oversee important dierences between groups or selection processes. Therefore, we apply a Multinominal logit model in the rst step in which the labour market choices are formal salaried employment, informal salaried employment and not working. The estimated inverse Mill's ratios from this model are included in the main wage equation. We do not nd qualitative 20 10 . Another robustness check concerns the denition of the education variable. All regressions are run including a dierent education variable, which is equal to one if the individuals has attained university and equal to zero if educational attainment was up to high school level rather than attainment of more than 10 years vs. less than 10 years. In all regressions, the coecient was larger and still signicant but not changing the results qualitatively.
One drawback of the data is that we cannot measure actual work experience as we do not have sucient information on job history. As work experience is measured by age minus years of education minus 6, the correlation between our work experience variable and age is high (about 97%). To remedy the concern that we are not actually measuring the eects of work experience but the returns to age, we plotted wages on years of age in Figure 7 . Comparing the plots with those on work experience it can be seen that there are dierences in age and experience proles. In a following step we estimated all regressions including age instead of experience. The coecients are larger for age than for experience and there are no signicant dierences between rural and urban workers. Hence, it can be concluded, that our experience variable is actually measuring the eect of work experience and not that of age. Moreover, all wage equations were also estimated including a cubic term of experience and with experience only. For some groups of workers, the coecients were also signicant but the ndings do not dier qualitatively from the discussed results. 11 10 We do not further discuss this methodology here as we are aware of the violation of the assumption of independent irrelevant alternatives in the Multinominal logit model. The results can be obtained from the corresponding author.
11 The result tables of the robustness checks are not displayed for the sake of brevity but can be obtained on request by the corresponding author. 
Migrants' labour market performance
In the subsequent analysis we investigate the labour market performance of rural-tourban migrants to see if it is in fact protable for a rural worker to migrate to a city.
Therefore we introduce a dummy variable which is equal to one if the individual has lived in a rural area at the age of 12 and in an urban area at the time of interview and zero otherwise to proxy the migration status of an individual. We add this variable to the regressors in the main wage regressions as well as in the rst-step selection equation. At this stage we will only discuss the results for the informal and formal sector separately as we again nd large dierences between sectors concerning ruralto-urban migrants' labour market performance. Furthermore, we will only discuss the results of the OLS models because we nd no evidence of selection bias.
First, we nd that rural-to-urban migrants are less likely to be working (see Table   5 ). Rural-to-urban migrants have a lower probability of 16% to be working compared to other urban workers. Second, given the migrant is working, his or her likelihood of working formally is 26% lower than the likelihood of an urban worker. 0.355 0.080 p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * , * * and * * * denote signicance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respcetively. The other characteristics are the same as in the previous models.
Our main interest lies on the analysis of migrants' reward for human capital in the urban areas. Hence, including the migrant regressor in the wage regression will show if migrant experience an earnings penalty or earnings premium and if this diers by human capital endowments. We nd that migrants have on average a wage gap of 23 about 8% in the informal sector (see column 3 in Table 5 ). Interacting the migrant dummy with human capital endowments reveals some important information on how dierent migrants gain from rural-to-urban migration and if migrating is reasonable in terms of wages. On the one hand, migrants who have obtained a university degree enjoy an average wage premium of 18.5% compared to urban high educated workers.
Interestingly, rural-to-urban migrants do not have lower returns to experience. The coecient is almost zero and insignicant. In the formal sector we cannot nd wage gaps between urban workers and rural-to-urban migrants.
This allows the conclusion that the high returns to experience found in the previous sections are indeed a pull factor into urban informal labour markets. The results should also be interpreted in the light of the ndings of Boucher et al. (2005) . They show that internal migrants in Mexico select on schooling whereas Mexicans who migrate to the U.S. are not more educated than stayers. Using the Mexican National Rural Household Survey they also nd that internal migration increases the schooling level of the rural population through high-skill family migration networks. Hence, migration to urban areas in Mexico also has a positive side eect, which will facilitate development in rural areas through education. This positive side eect is only valid if the migrant nds employment in the urban area.
Discussion
The ndings provide evidence that rural-urban wage dierentials exist in Mexico and that there are dierences in the decomposition between in formal and informal workers. Denitely, dierences in all human capital related factors explain a large part of the rural-urban wage gap in the informal sector, while only education explains part of the wage gap in the formal sector. Additionally, in the informal sector, returns to experience are much lower for rural than for urban workers, even after controlling for a large number of observable characteristics. When considering that only a small part of the formal sector resides in the rural areas and wages are signicantly lower in rural areas, small returns to experience are denitely a push factor out of the rural and into the urban labour market, seemingly preferably and possibly easier into the informal sector when the individual is endowed with at least some years of experience.
Furthermore, the results seem to explain, at least partly, the macroeconomic picture described in the introduction. If the observed wage pattern continues to exist, low returns to experience will not only act as a push factor away from rural areas and into the cities but also serve as an impediment for return migration. That rural-to-urban migrants do not have lower returns to experience supports this result. Furthermore, rural-to-urban migrants enjoy an average wage premium for high education. This will 24 have further consequences for the existence of the informal sector. Assuming that formal jobs do not emerge as quickly as the rural population migrates and the social security protection system does not change, the informal sector and unemployment will further increase in the cities.
As we are able to control for a large number of personal characteristics, it is likely that unobserved rm characteristics explain parts of the wage dierential. As has been shown by other authors, rms in the cities are more productive and hence they pay higher wages (Glaeser and Maré, 2001, Gould, 2007) . It seems plausible, that work experience only is rewarded in urban rms rather than in rural rms, which is supported by our results. This will be an incentive for individuals to migrate to the cities to accumulate human capital in the form of work experience and be accordingly paid. This is also in line with the theoretical suggestion by Lucas (2004) .
For policy makers, these ndings give direction for policy in at least two respects. First, there is a need for the government to attract more`good' rms in rural areas in which work experience is needed or worthy experience can be obtained. There already exist few examples of foreign or international rms, which settled in rural areas and enforced some development in the areas around the factory. With the settling of a Volkswagen plant near Puebla in the 1960s, a previously poor rural area was turned into a ourishing city by improving the infrastructure and providing jobs for skilled and unskilled workers. Suppliers settled in a nearby business park, oering more and diverse employment possibilities. Furthermore, the presence of large inter-or multinational rms from developed countries helps to improve or at least maintain the health and safety standards, the adherence of human and labour rights and a relatively high wage level. Of course, there may also be examples in some countries, where the presence of foreign rms does not increase the standard of living and the freedoms for the employed workforce. However, there is supposedly a tendency towards improvement of regional labour markets through the settlement of particular large rms with an international background. Hand in hand with the employment in a large rm goes the increased possibility to be registered with the IMSS. The descriptive statistics show that the average number of employees in a rm that employs an informal worker is 50, while a formal worker has on average 119 coworkers. However, the attraction of large rm with international background is not enough as a method to increase formal employment. Policies needs to address the incentives to work formally, for example by changing the social insurance schemes which currently impose perverse incentives for registration with the IMSS (Levy, 2008) .
Conclusion
This study investigates the dierences in wages between rural and urban workers in the informal and formal sectors of Mexico's labour market. Using the novel, representative Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) it has been shown that a large urban wage premium exists in Mexico and that returns to experience are small in rural areas compared to urban areas. Applying Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition techniques and correcting for selectivity into formal, i.e. registered employment, it has been shown that in the informal sector the dierences in returns to human capital endowments, such as work experience, education and cognitive ability, explain large parts of the rural-urban wage gap. Furthermore, the unexplained part is solely based on the dierence in returns to work experience between rural and urban workers. Hence, the more work experience a worker has accumulated, the higher is his monetary disadvantage when he or she works in a rural area as compared to an urban area. In the formal sector, only dierences in education contribute to the explanation of the wage gap and no dierences in coecients can be identied. Furthermore, we nd no dierence in returns to experience for rural-to-urban migrants and even a positive wage premium for migrants with high education.
The ndings suggest that there is a large incentive for rural residents with at least some years of work experience to migrate from the rural into urban areas in Mexico where they will receive higher rewards for work experience. If the observed wage pattern continues to exist, the found low rural returns to experience will not only act as a push factor away from rural areas and into the big cities but also serve as an impediment for return migration. Moreover, assuming that the number of rural-tourban migrants increases faster than formal jobs emerge, which seems realistic given the low incentives to register, either under-employment or informal employment will increase in the cities. This will lead to further economic and social problems and continuing low economic growth.
Our study shows that it is important to separate the population into dierent groups, especially distinguishing between rural and urban workers as their incentives and outcomes dier largely, even independently of the personal endowments. To our knowledge, this is the rst study for Mexico which has been able to separate the Mexican workforce by formality and locality and highlights the importance of the investigation of dierent human capital endowments, especially work experience.
The results provide direction for Mexican policy. One way to counteract rural-tourban migration would be the strategic attraction of particular large rms in a rural area. This improves infrastructure, creates jobs and supposedly facilitates to observe 26 the (non-)adherence of labour rights. Furthermore, large (international) rms tend to pay relatively high wages and are more likely to register their workers with the IMSS, which in turn can reduce poverty and welfare dependency. In such rms, e.g. Volkswagen in Puebla, workers can accumulate work experience and become more productive for which they will then get accordingly paid. The settlement of such large rms and the related development could also serve as a pull factor for return migration to previously rural areas and also generate the incentive for the rural population to stay. 
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